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THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE: THE 
NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The direct broadcast satellite, 1 like most valuable resources, is both 
economically scarce and vitally needed by all countries. 2 There is a need 
for such satellites in the fully developed countries in order to facilitate 
the efficient exchange of an entire spectrum of information: from poli-
tics to cultural advancement. At the same time there is a pressing need 
for such satellites in the developing countries, such as India, 3 if the 
stated social and political goals of their governments are to be achieved. 
Concomitant with the potential benefits to be derived from such satel-
lites, however, there arise serious possibilities for abuse. The areas in 
which there is great potential for abuse include broadcast intervention, 4 
cultural imperialism, propaganda, spill-over, 5 frequency allocation, and 
1. There are three types of communication satellites: passive, active, and direct 
broadcast. 
Passive satellites rettect a signal transmitted from one earth station to another earth 
station. This type of satellite requires the use of extremely powerful transmitters and 
complex, sensitive receivers, both of which are exceedingly expensive. 
Active satellites amplify the signals received before transmitting them to a ground 
station. The higher cost of the satellite is balanced by the relatively low cost for the 
transmitting and receiving apparatus. 
Direct broadcast satellites are hybrid active satellites which have a synchronous orbit. 
The direc~ broadcast satellite not only has the ability to amplify signals it receives from 
an earth station, but also possesses the capacity to transmit audio and visual signals 
directly into an individual's television set. A synchronous orbit is a circular orbit around 
the earth in the plane of the equator. The satellite's period of revolution is the same as 
the earth's. This means that it will remain in a fixed position with respect to a point on 
the earth and can, therefore, provide uninterrupted services from a particular ground 
station to a large area of the earth. See Smith, The Legal Ordering of Satellite Telecom-
munications: Problems and Alternatives, 44 INDIANA L.J. 338 (1968-69) [hereinafter cited 
as Smithj. 
2. Gold , Direct Broadcast Satellites: Implications for Less Developed Countries and 
for World Order, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 66 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Gold]. 
:i. Conditions in India and other similar developing countries would seem to demand 
such services as would be provided by direct broadcast satellites. India has large inaccessi-
ble areas, a high illiteracy rate and minimum communications facilities. The benefits to 
be derived would primarily be educational and industrial. Id. at 67. Also note that the 
United States will launch and position a direct broadcast satellite over India sometime 
in 1974. The Department of Atomic Energy of India will operate the satellite. See Memo-
randum of Understandinu Between the Department of Atomic Energy of the Government 
of India and the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration, U.N. 
Doc. A/AC. 105/72 (1969), 8 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1281 (1969). 
4. See notes 46 & 48 infra and accompanying text. 
5. See note 87 infra . 
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orbital slot allocation.6 The abuse potential in these areas is of such a 
magnitude that, if left unabated, they would prove to be insurmount-
able barriers to the full development of an international direct broadcast 
satellite system. 
Through the simultaneous creation of both benefit and abuse po-
tential, the direct broadcast satellite has necessitated some form of 
international regulation of its use. There are three major proposals 
which have been suggested to achieve this end. These proposals are: (1) 
Intelsat, the United States sponsored solution, 7 (2) the UNESCO Draft 
Declaration on the use of satellite broadcasting,8 and (3) the U.S.S.R. 
Draft Convention on direct television broadcasting. 9 This article dis-
cusses the responsiveness of these proposals to the issues raised by direct 
broadcast satellites. 
However, it is essential that, from the outset, the reader appreciate 
the nature of the problem with which the international lawyer and the 
diplomat are faced as they attempt to regulate the use of direct broad-
cast satellites. Accordingly, it is appropriate, if not crucial, to begin the 
study of what ought to be done to regulate direct broadcast satellites 
with a brief sketch of what has been done and what currently comprises 
the status quo regarding such regulatory attempts. 
II. THE PROGRESS MADE BY THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY TOWARDS EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF 
THE DIRECT BROADCAST SA TELL/TE 
Currently, there is no unity of thought in the world as to either an 
international set of guiding principles for the use of direct broadcast 
satellite8 or the formation of a single global system of telecommuni-
cations. This observation is evidenced by the activities of numerous 
agencies· and countries in the field of satellite communications. 
One such agency is the International Telecommunications Union, 10 
6. See note 77 infra and accompanying text. 
7. Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organiza-
tion (INTELSAT), Aug. 20, 1971, [19721 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 (effective Feb. 
12, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Intelsat]. Operating Agreement relating to the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), Aug. 20, 1971, [1972] 23 
U.S.T. 4091, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 (effective Feb. 12, 1973). 
8. The UN ESCO Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcast-
in.i; fur the Free Fluw of Information, The Spread of Education and Greater Cultural 
f,'xchan.i;e, ll.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/104 (1972), 11 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1476 (1972) [hereinafter 
cited as UNK'iCOI. 
9. The U.S.S . R. Draft Convention on Principles Governing the Use by States of 
Artificial f,'arth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting, U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972), 
11 lNT'r. LEG. MAT. 1;n5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as U.S.S.R.J 
10. Since 1947, the I.T.U. has been a specialized agency of the United Nations. The 
basic instrument of the I.T. U. is the International Telecommunications Convention, the 
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whose main function is the allocation of electromagnetic frequencies" 
for specific types of use. 12 In 1959 the I.T.U. first revised its regulations 
in order to allocate frequencies to radio communication services for 
space research purposes. 13 Later, in 1963, I.T. U. once again revised its 
regulations and for the first time allocated frequency bands specifically 
to communication satellites. 14 Finally, in 1971, at the World Administra-
tive Conference for Space Telecommunications, 15 specific problems aris-
ing from the use of direct broadcast satellites were discussed. The results 
of those discussions were refinements of I.T.U.'s specialized operations 
in the areas_ of radio frequency spectrum utilization and allocation. 16 
Another international agency that has been active in the area of 
direct broadcast satellites is the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 17 One of the Committee's three working 
groups is the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites, which, to 
date, has submitted four reports concerning direct broadcast satellites. 
In the first of these reports it was noted that the use of direct broadcast 
satellites on an operational basis was not likely until after 1985: 18 How-
ever, in its second report in 1969, 19 the Working Group concluded that 
current version of which entered into force Jan. 1, 1967. See International Telecommuni-
cations Convention, May 29, 1967 [1967] 18 U.S .T. 575, T.l.A.S. No. 6267. According to 
some authors , the I.T.U. has, and may continue to play the leading role in the allocation 
of electromagnetic frequencies . 
11. S. LAY & H . TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE 114 
( 1970) I hereinafter cited as S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD]. 
12. Id. Basically, the I.T.U. allocates bands of frequencies for types of use rather than 
to specific users. Once a frequency band has been assigned for a use such as satellite 
communications, the various nations then assign specific frequencies to their own stations. 
These assigned frequencies are then registered with the International Frequency Registra-
tion Board of I.T.U. on a first come first serve basis. 
rn . The revis ions were accomplished at the 1959 Administrative Radio Conference, 
held in Geneva. See U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/100 48, para. 186(i) (1959). 
14. The specific revisions concerning communication satellites were enacted at the 
Extra Ordinary Administrative Radio Conference to Allocate Frequency Bands for Space 
Radio Purposes, held at Geneva in 1963. See Final Acts of the Extra Ordinary Administra-
tive Radio Conference to Allocate Frequency Bands for Space Radio Communication 
Purposes, Nov. 1963, I 19641 15 U.S.T. 887, T.l.A.S. No. 5603. A major accomplishment 
of the 196:3 Conference was the increasing of the percentage of the radio frequency spec-
trum allocated to outer space activities. At the 1959 Conference (supra note 13) only 1 % 
had been allocated , but at the 1963 Conference that was increased to 15%. See Smith, 
supra note 1, at :356. 
lS. S ee note 13 supra , at 50, para . 199. 
16. A rather detailed overview of the results, which deals basically with the problems 
of technical allocation of frequencies to broadcast satellites and earth exploration satel-
lites , is available in id. at 51-60. 
17. The Committee's twenty-eight member countries include the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. Id. at :3. 
18. For a summary of the Working Group's report see id. at 10. 
19. For summary of the Working Group's second report see id. at 10, para. 36. Also 
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there was then a present need to consider the social, cultural and legal 
implications of such a satellite system. Of particular importance was the 
Working Group's conclusion that there was no international institution 
which had the competence to take action in all the fields of direct 
broadcasting. Therefore, the Working Group recommended that the 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space should 
sustain the interest that it had shown in coordinating activity in the 
field of direct broadcasting. 20 In a subsequent report, issued in 1970, the 
Working Group noted that there were several legal questions raised by 
the use of direct broadcast satellites and that they were considering the 
possibility of establishing a set of guiding principles on the subject. 21 
There were no indications in that report, however, that such a set of 
general principles had been established.22 
It was not until November 1972 that the Working Group was recon-
vened under the authority of a United Nations General Assembly resolu-
tion23 with instructions that it study new material that had become 
available since its last meeting. Among this new material was the 
UNESCO Draft Declaration, 24 which was one of the few attempts made 
to establish an international set of guiding principles for the use of direct 
broadcast satellites. 
The result of this resolution was still another General Assembly 
resolution, entitled Preparation of an International Convention on Prin-
ciples Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for 
Direct Television Broadcasting.25 The importance of this resolution was 
three-fold: (1) the United Nations officially recognized the pressing need 
to prevent the conversion of direct television broadcasting into a source 
of international conflict and the need to protect the sovereignty of states 
from external interference; (2) the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
note that this report came out only a few months prior to the India-United States agree-
ment. See note 3 supra. 
20. It is interesting to note that at the time of the Working Group's second report 
Intelsat was in existence. So, in effect, the report was a pronouncement by the Working 
Group that Intelsat itself was not competent to regulate the use of direct broadcast 
satellites under its structure at that time. It will be shown later in this article that at 
present, Intelsat is still not completely competent to handle the issues raised by direct 
broadcast satellites. 
21. See note 13 supra at 10, paras. 37 & 38. 
22. This conclusion is arrived at when one notes that the Working Group, after 
issuing their third report in 1970, was not reconvened until November 1972. The reason 
for the Working Group not being reconvened earlier, in order to work on the establishment 
of a set of guiding principles, is that the Working Group itself felt that there were not 
enough materials available for it to act upon. 
2:1. See G.A. RES. 2915, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at paras. 18, 19 & 23, U.N. Doc. 
N8730 0972). 
24. See UNESCO, supra note 8. 
25. See G.A. Res. 2916, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. N8730 (1972). 
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Outer Space was requested to undertake the elaboration of such princi-
ples and to consider the U.S.S.R. Draft Convention26 on direct television 
broadcasting as a possible model; and (3) the General Assembly resolu-
tion was voted against by only one country, the United States. 27 
Analysis of the factors involved in the U.S. decision suggest that the 
rationale was twofold, but that both aspects of the controlling policy 
stemmed from the same key consideration, Intelsat. The first of these 
aspects is that the United States was heavily committed financially to 
the Intelsat consortium, 28 which operates independently of the United 
Nations. The second reason was possibly a fear that whatever principles 
were established would conflict with the operating policies of Intelsat. 
At present the establishment of an international convention is still 
under active consideration. Despite the United Nations recognition of 
the need for one, however, there are no indications of any rapid develop-
ments that would lead to the establishment of such an international 
convention. 29 
A third international agency involved in the area of regulating di-
rect broadcast satellites in addition to standard communication satel-
lites, is the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium 
(Intelsat). Intelsat is an organization whose member countries together 
own and operate the global commercial communications satellite sys-
tem. 30 The member nations of Intelsat are responsible for a very high 
percentage, perhaps in excess of ninety percent, of all the telecommuni-
cation traffic in the world. 31 Intelsat was originally established in 1964 
under two international interim agreements. 32 Two years later a third 
26. See U.S.S.R., supra note 9. 
27. The resolution was approved by a vote of 102 in favor to 1 against (United States), 
with 7 abstentions. 11 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1470 (1972). 
28. See note 38 infra and accompanying text. 
29. The present state of affairs is demonstrated by the Working Group on Direct 
Broadcast Satellites' 1973 Report. In its report, the Working Group stated that it was 
aware of the need for a set of guiding principles on the use of direct broadcast satellites 
and would continue to give the matter its full attention. See U.N. Doc. NAC. 105/117 
(1973). 
For further reports dealing with the United Nation's discussions on international 
principles governing the use of direct broadcast satellites see G.A. Res. 2917, 27 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. N8730 (1972) on the preparation of arrangements on princi-
ples governing the use of artificial earth satellites. See also The Report of the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/8720 (1972), which has scheduled 
another meeting of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites for March, 1974. 
ao. See note 13 supra, at 131, para. 555. 
:n. See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11, at 124. Also note that the U.S.S.R. 
is not a member of Intelsat, although the Republic of China is. 10 INT'L LEG. MAT. 909 
(1971). 
:32. The Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial 
Communication Satellite System, August 20, 1964, (1964] 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.l.A.S. No. 
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international agreement was incorporated which provided for the settle-
ment of disputes among Members through a process of arbitration. 33 At 
present Intelsat is governed by the new Definitive Agreements, which 
entered into force January 1, 1973. 34 The Definitive Agreements entirely 
replace the 1964 interim agreements. 
Under the present Intelsat documents, the purpose of Intelsat is 
to achieve a single global commercial telecommunication satellite sys-
tem as part of an improved global telecommunications network which 
will provide expanded telecommunications services to all areas of the 
world and which will contribute to world peace and understanding. 35 
The operating structures used in attempting to achieve this goal are: An 
Assembly of Parties, 36 Meeting of Signatories, 37 Board of Governors, 38 
and a Director-General. 39 Voting participation at the Board of Governors 
level, is based upon a percentage investment system.40 The United 
5646. Special Agreement, August 20, 1964, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1745, T.1.A.S . No. 5646. 
33. Supplementary Agreement on Arbitration, 4 INT'L LEG. MAT. 735 (1965). 
34. See Intelsat, supra note 7. 
35. Id. art. III for the scope of Intelsat activities. 
36. Id. art. VII (Assembly of Parties). 
a) The Assembly of Parties shall be composed of all the Parties and shall be the 
principal organ of Intelsat. 
c) The Assembly of Parties shall have the following functions and powers: 
(iv) to authorize through general rules or by specific determinations, 
the utilization of the Intelsat space segment . .. . 
(v) to review, in order to ensure the application of the principle of non-
discrimination, the general rules established pursuant to sub-
paragraph b(v) of Article VIII .... 
37. Id. art . VIII (Meeting of Signatories). 
a) Shall be composed of all the Signatories. 
b) The Meeting of Signatories shall have the following functions and powers: 
(v) . .. to establish general rules upon the recommendation of the 
Board of Governors . 
38. Id. art. IX (Board of Governors). 
a) The Board of Governors shall be composed of: 
1) one Governor representing each Signatory whose investment share 
is not less than the minimum investment share as determined in 
accordance with paragraph (b) . . . . 
b) (i) . . . the minimum investment share that will entitle a Signatory or group 
of Signatories to be represented on the Board of Governors shall be equal to the 
investment share of the Signatory holding position thirteen .. .. 
.See also, id. art. X. 
a) !The Board of Governors! shall have the responsibility for the design devel-
opment, construction, establishment, operation and maintenance of the Intelsat 
Space segment . 
:m. Id. art. XI. 
40. Id. art. V. 
b) Each signatory shall have an investment share corresponding to its percen-
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States participates as a Governor through its designated representative 
COMSAT. 41 Under the 1964 Interim Agreements COMSAT had a voting 
percentage of sixty percent as compared to 30.5 percent for European 
Signatories, and 8.5 percent divided among Australia, Canada and 
Japan. 42 However, under the new Definitive Agreements COMSAT's 
voting percentage has been arbitrarily limited to forty percent. 43 Even 
with the decrease in the United States control, the U.S.S.R. has opted 
not to join Intelsat. Instead, it has established its own telecom-
munications satellite system. 44 At the present time, it is only being used 
for domestic purposes but it has obvious international potential which 
will probably bring it into conflict with Intelsat. 
The Soviet Union is not the only other country trying to develop 
international telecommunications capabilities. France, England, Ger-
many, Japan and other nations have the ability individually or collec-
tively to develop regional or global communication satellite systems. 45 
It is against this diverse background that the Intelsat, UNESCO, 
and U.S.S.R. solutions will be analyzed in terms of their responsiveness 
to the various issues raised by the injection of the direct broadcast 
satellite into any telecommunications system. 
tage of all utilization of the Intelsat space segment by all Signatories . 
Id. art. IX. 
f) . . . each Governor shall have a voting participation equal to that part of the 
investment share of the Signatory, or group of Signatories, he represents .... 
41. COMSAT is a privately owned Communication Satellite Corporation that repre-
sents the U.S. in Intelsat. It was created under the Communication Satellite Act, P.L. 
87-624, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44 (1962). 
42. Smith supra note 1, at 347. 
4:-L S ee Intelsat, supra note 7, art. IX para. g(iv): 
No Governor may cast more than forty percent of the total voting participation 
of all Signatories and groups of Signatories represented on the Board of Gover-
nors. 
This provision was an attempt to calm the protests of many of the poorer nations who 
feared a monopoly by the United States, and to compromise the U.S.S.R.'s criticism that 
such a weighted voting procedure was incompatible with the principle of sovereign 
equality. See Smith, supra note 1, at 349. 
44. Intersputnik is an agreement on the establishment of Intersputnik, an interna-
tional system of space communication via satellite; it was signed in Moscow on November 
15, 1971 by: Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba, Mongolia, Po-
land , Romania, U.S.S.R., and Czechoslovakia. The Agreement is open for accession by 
all States of the world. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/100 137 (1959). 
45. Among other countries or groups of countries which have considered the possibili-
ties of national or regional communications satellites are Canada and a few Latin Ameri-
can countries. Some of the organizations involved are the European Conference of Postal 
and Telecommunications Administration representing 23 European countries; Eurospace, 
a private association of industrial firms and professional bodies from 12 European coun-
tries; the European Space Research Organization and many other organizations with 
membership encompassing private and public sectors on both sides of the Atlantic and 
Iron Curtain. See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11, at 104 n.6. 
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III. ISSUES AND PRESENTLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. Broadcast Intervention 
Direct broadcast satellites open up the possibility of broadcast in-
tervention by television similar to that presently achieved by radio. 46 As 
a result, the leaders of many countries have expressed concern over the 
fact that the United States or Russia, with as few as three direct broad-
cast satellites, could reach every television screen in the world. 47 
Broadcast intervention can be divided into two closely related prob-
lems. The first of these is known as cultural imperialism, and is raised 
by many countries which fear that certain types of programs from the 
broadcasting country would tend to promote unwarranted and un-
needed changes. There is also the fear that the programs could generate 
strong desires for a different standard of living thereby creating tensions 
within the receiving country that its, government would rather do with-
out. 48 The second problem in the area of broadcast intervention, is that 
the direct broadcast satellite could all too easily be used by the broad-
casting country for propaganda purposes. 49 
1. INTELSAT 
The issues presented above offer tremendous avenues of abuse and 
therefore barriers to the full development of the benefits to be derived 
from the use of direct broadcast satellites. However, nowhere in the 
present Intelsat agreements does there appear to be a provision that 
deals specifically with these issues. One can infer a sanction against 
broadcast interventions for the purposes of cultural imperialism and 
propaganda from Article III of the Definitive Agreement. There mention 
is made of providing "telecommunication services of high quality 
•••• " 50 Other provisions that offer the potential for development 
of a set of rules governing the use of direct broadcast satellites are 
46. See Gold, supra note 2, at 78. An example of radio broadcast intervention are the 
many radio wars between the Soviet Union and China, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and Europe and the Soviet Union. 
47. See Hearings Before the House Sub-Comm. on National Security Policy and 
Scientific Development, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1969). 
48. Such countries as Canada have viewed with concern the great impact that United 
States television has had or would have on Canadian culture, and as a result have re-
stricted use of American programs in Canada. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1970, at 8, col. 1. 
Iceland has also decided that its television audiences, despite their desires, should not 
receive American programs at all. See Gold, supra note 2, at 76. 
49. Due to its capability of transmitting directly into an individual's television set, 
the potential for creating internal unrest, hatred, violence and general dissension is greatly 
amplified. 
50. See Intelstat, supra note 7, Article III, para . (a) seems to speak more to the 
quality of the goods provided rather than the use that they are put to. 
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those that (1) authorize the Assembly of Parties through general rules 
to determine the utilization of the Intelsat space segment, 51 (2) authorize 
the Meeting of Signatories to establish general rules concerning the 
utilization of the Intelsat space segment,52 and (3) authorize the Board 
of Governors to adopt terms and conditions regarding the use of the 
space segment owned and operated by Intelsat.53 
Despite these possibilities there has been no indication of the devel-
opment of a set of guiding principles by which to govern the use of direct 
broadcast satellites. Instead the provisions of the Intelsat agreements 
remain directed to the administrative processes of organizing access to 
the system and not to the uses to which the particular State would put 
the communication satellite. The potential for abuse of the direct broad-
cast satellite, therefore, remains unabated. 
Even though there are no provisions that specifically deal with the 
issue of abuse of direct broadcast satellites, there are provisions that 
refer to the settlement of disputes. 54 Despite the effectiveness of the 
arbitration process in disputes between Parties or Signatories involving 
communication satellites, it is inadequate to the task of regulating dis-
putes arising from the abuse of a direct broadcast satellite and a non-
Member country. This conclusion is based upon a reading of Article 
XVIII of the Operating Agreement, 55 in light of the following situations: 
A Party nation of Intelsat, possessing an earth station, broadcasts pro-
grams containing propaganda into a non-Member nation via direct 
broadcast satellites and that nation strongly resents the content of those 
51. See Intelsat, supra note 7. 
52. Id. 
5:{ . · Id . art. X, para. a( vii). 
I The Board of Governors shall have the power to adopt] terms and conditions 
governing the allotment of Intelsat space segment. 
"Space segment" means the telecommunication satellites and the tracking, telemetry, 
command, control, monitoring and related facilities and equipment required to support 
the operation of these satellites . Id. at 910, art. I, para. (h). 
54. Id. art. XVIII. 
a) All legal disputes arising in connection with the rights and obligations under 
this Agreement or in connection with obligations undertaken by Parties, be-
tween Parties with respect to each other or between INTELSAT and one or more 
Parties , if not otherwise settled in a reasonable time, shall be submitted to 
arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Annex C . ... Any legal dis-
pute arising in connection with the rights and obligations under this Agreement 
or the Operating Agreement between one or more Parties and one or more 
Signatories may be submitted to arbitration ... , provided the Party or Parties 
and Signatory or Signatories involved agree to such arbitration. 
b) All legal disputes . .. between a Party and a State which has ceased to be a 
Party .. . shall be submitted to arbitration .. .. ·provided the State which has 
ceaRed to be a Party so agrees. 
55. Id. 
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programs. The result, under Article XVIII, is that the non-Member is 
barred from submitting the dispute to Intelsat for arbitration. The rea-
sons for that result are: (1) even though the broadcasting country is a 
Party, the dispute does not derive from any contractual obligations 
between the Party and the non-Member, (2) the dispute is not between 
Parties because the non-Member is not one, 56 (3) it is not between a 
Party and a Signatory, 57 or betwee~ Signatories, and (4) it is not be-
tween a Party and a State that has ceased to be a Party. Therefore, there 
is no relief to the non-Member receiving nation under Article XVIII. 
Meanwhile, the broadcasting Party nation has been allowed to abuse 
the direct broadcast satellite and to inflict serious damage on the receiv-
ing country. 
The need for a non-Member receiving country to have access to 
Intelsat's arbitration process is further magnified by the very nature of 
the direct broadcast satellite. By employing such a satellite one avoids 
the need to route television broadcasts through a ground receiving sta-
tion in the country for which the programs are intended. Therefore any 
control over program content that the receiving country would exercise 
through its control of its earth station, would be dissipated by another 
country's use of a direct broadcast satellite. 
The foregoing illustrates the need on the part of non-Member re-
ceiving countries for access to the Intelsat arbitration system as well as 
the unresponsiveness of Intelsat to that need. 
2. THE U.S.S.R. DRAFT CONVENTION58 
In contrast to the inadequacy of the Intelsat agreements in dealing 
with the issues raised by the abuse of direct broadcast satellites, 59 the 
U.S.S.R. Draft Convention speaks directly to those issues. The U.S.S.R. 
Draft Convention specifically prohibits the broadcasting of materials 
which are "immoral or instigating in nature or otherwise aimed at inter-
fering in the domestic affairs or foreign policy of other States. " 60 It also 
provides that "States Party to [the] Convention may carry out direct 
television broadcasting by means of artificial earth satellites to foreign 
States only with the express consent of the latter."61 Any transmission 
56. Id. art. I, para. (f). 
f) "Party" means a State for which the Agreement has entered into force or been 
provisionally applied. 
57. Id. para . (g). 
g) "Signatory" means a Party, or the telecommunication entity designated by 
a Party, which has signed the Operating Agreement . 
58. See U.S.S.R., supra note 9. 
59. Supra page 106. 
60 . See U.S.S.R., supra note 9, at 1378, art. IV. 
61. Id ., art. V. 
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of television programs without the express consent of the receiving state 
would be regarded as illegal. The Draft Convention itself contains a list 
of types of programs that would be treated as illegal. 62 
As to any provisions regarding the settlement of potential disputes, 
the Draft Convention offers a rather simple but startling solution. 
Any State Party to [the] Convention may employ the means at its 
disposal to counteract illegal television broadcasting of which it is the 
object not only in its own territory but also in outer space and other 
areas beyond the limits of the national jurisdiction of any State.83 
What Article IX amounts to is a blank check approval of the use of any 
means available from mere jamming of signals to actual destruction of 
the satellite. Combined with the Draft Convention's list of illegal broad-
casts, the potential for international conflict over the use of direct 
broadcast satellites becomes very pronounced.64 This result is precisely 
what is sought to be avoided by the development of an international set 
of principles to govern direct broadcast satellites. 
3. THE UNESCO DECLARATION65 
The UNESCO Draft Declaration, like the U.S:S.R. Draft Conven-
tion, also addresses the issues raised by abuse of direct broadcast satel-
lites. The Declaration specifically provides that satellite broadcasting 
shall "respect the sovereignty of and the equality of all States, and shall 
be conducted with due regard for the rights of individual persons 
•••• "
66 It also requires that account be taken of the needs and rights 
of audiences, 67 that each country have the right to decide on the content 
of the programs broadcast by satellite to its people, 611 and that any 
H2. Id. at 1:n9, art.. VI, para. (2)a-f. 
a) Broadcasts detrimental to the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity. 
h) Broadcasts representing interference in intra State conflicts of any kind. 
c) Broadcasts involving an encroachment on fundamental human rights, on the 
dignity and worth of the human person and on fundamental freedom for all 
without distinct.ions as to race, sex, language or religion. 
d) Broadcasts propagandizing violence, horrors, pornography and the use of 
narcotics. 
e) Broadcasts undermining the foundations of the local civilization, culture, way 
of life, tradition or language. 
f) Broadcasts which mis-inform the public on these or other matters. 
();!. Id. at 1:l79, art.. IX, para. (1). 
64 . The net effect of the U.S.S.R. proposal would appear to be not a lessening of 
conflicts resulting from abuse of the direct broadcasting satellite, but rather a lessening 
of operational telecommunication satellites . 
6G. Se<' UN ]<;,'-,'CO, supra note 8. 
66. Id. at 1477, art . II, paras. (1), (2). 
67. Id. at 1478, art.. IV, para. (2) . 
68. Id., art. VI, para. (2) . 
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cultural programs should respect the distinctive character, value and 
dignity of each country.69 However, unlike the U.S.S.R. Draft Conven-
tion, the UNESCO Declaration does not provide for the use of jamming 
or satellite destruction as a means of ending transmissions which violate 
the principles set forth in the Declaration. As a matter of fact, the 
UNESCO Declaration does not contain any provisions regarding the 
settlement of disputes. 70 
Reviewing the responsiveness of the proposals to the issues pre-
sented, there are (1) the Intelsat agreements, which contain no provi-
sions speaking directly to the abuse of direct broadcast satellites and 
which contain a dispute settlement provision that is inadequate to deal 
with direct broadcast satellites; (2) the U.S.S.R. Draft Convention, 
which specifically lists programs considered to be illegal when broadcast 
over a direct broadcast satellite, and which also provides for destruction 
of the offensive satellite by the receiving country at its own discretion; 
and (3) the UNESCO proposal, which speaks peripherally to the issues 
raised by abuse of the direct broadcast satellite but contains no specific 
provisions relating to the settlement of disputes. 
The end result is that the highly volatile issues of broadcast inter-
vention, cultural imperialism, and propaganda still remain unresolved 
at a point where the use of the direct broadcast satellite is imminent. 
B. Access to the Telecommunication Satellite System 
The issue of access is composed of two sub-issues: frequency alloca-
tion and orbital slot allocation. 
1. FREQUENCY ALLOCATION 
Neither the Intelsat agreements, the UNESCO proposal, nor the 
U.S.S.R. Draft Convention attempt to obtain authority for determining 
what bands of the radio frequency spectrum will be used for direct 
broadcast satellites. This lack of concern with such an important and 
essential area indicates that there is agreement that the I.T.U.71 should 
continue to exercise authority over the allocation of radio frequencies for 
particular uses. 
Even though most nations of the world are members of the l.T.U., 
69. Id., art. VII, para. (2) . 
70. One could infer from the lack of any dispute settlement provision, that the various 
States would have to work out their own solution. This result could lead to the adoption 
of methods ranging from jamming to satellite destruction: precisely the methods encom-
passed in the U.S.S.R. Draft Convention . 
71. See International Telecommunications Convention, May 29, 1967, [1967J 18 
U.S.T. 575, T.I.A.S . No. 6267. 
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violations of frequency assignments are numerous. 72 An attempt was 
made, at the 1965 Montreux Convention, to strengthen the authoritative 
and legislative powers of the I. T. U. by providing for an Optional Proto-
col on Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.73 However, both the United 
States and Russia withheld approval and as a result are governed by the 
rather permissive dispute settlement provisions of Article 28 of the 
I.T.U. Convention. 74 This refusal to submit to compulsory arbitration 
poses an unneeded additional barrier to the furtherance of international 
cooperation in the field of direct broadcast satellites. 
Another problem in the field of frequency allocation is the actual 
allocation procedures used by the I.T.U.75 Those procedures generate 
the potential for a monopoly of telecommunication frequences by a few 
countries. The countries referred to are the technically advanced coun-
tries that will soon preempt all of the frequencies that have been allo-
cated to space telecommunications purposes.76 Therefore, unless a set of 
international principles as to the use of these frequencies by direct 
broadcast satellites is developed, the few countries possessing such sat-
ellites shall have an unrestrained monopoly over telecommunications. 
2. ORBITAL SLOT ALLOCATION 
The issue of orbital slot allocation raises a problem because there 
is a practical limit to the number of direct broadcast satellites that can 
be placed in orbit without interfering with one another. This could ena-
ble one nation to deprive another of an entire area of broadcast coverage 
by merely placing three direct broadcast satellites in a preferred position 
over the equator.77 The results of such action would be a monopoly over 
7'2. ,Se<' S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11, at 114. Also note that among the 
Member nations are the United States and the U.S .S.R. 
?:{. Id. at I In n.5. 
74 . Article '28 of the I.T.U . Convention provides for diplomatic negotiations or, in the 
case of any existing agreements between disputants or failure to resolve the question, for 
arbitration under Annex C. The provisions of Annex C are couched in very permissive 
terms. Sc•<• S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11. 
Also note t.hat the unwillingness of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to approve the com-
pulsory arhitrat.ion agreement seems to indicate that both nations are afraid of losing in 
a dispute over a claim of right over a frequency. 
7fJ. See note I2 supra and accompanying text. 
7() . In the field of direct broadcast satellites there are very few countries with the 
financial and technical capacities to build and launch such satellites. Under the l.T.U. 
procedures a nation may not assign frequencies within an allocated band until it has the 
capacity to use t.hat frequency. Therefore, the more advanced countries will soon be found 
to have assigned most of the allocated frequencies. 
77 . There are three orbital slots per frequency per synchronous orbit. Direct broad-
cast. satellites operate on U.H.F. frequency in the range of 750-900 MHz. With an average 
hand width of 6 MH2 per frequency there would be only 25 usable frequencies for a direct 
broadcast. satellite. With a limit of three slots per frequency in order to avoid interference 
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coverage of a particular area by one nation. Once such a monopoly had 
been achieved, all other broadcasting countries would be forced to ac-
cept the monopolizing country's terms if they wanted access to its satel-
lite system and its area of coverage. In addition, any of the receiving 
countries within the monopolizing country's area ofcoverage would have 
their program content determined solely by the monopolizing country. 
Therefore, there is a genuine need for an international system or 
code under which all nations desiring access to a direct broadcast satel-
lite system could attain such access once all the orbital slots had been 
filled. 
3. INTELSAT 
The problem of access to the direct broadcast satellite system has 
been dealt with in the new Intelsat agreements. An initial acknowledge-
ment of the problem is contained in the preamble to the Definitive 
Agreement where it states "satellite communications should be organ-
ized in such a way as to permit all people to have access to the global 
satellite system .... " 78 In an effort to attain that goal, Intelsat has 
been organized into three main bodies that together control access to 
and utilization of the Intelsat satellite system. 79 The voting procedures 
used at all three levels are, a two-thirds majority of the present voting 
members80 with voting participation at both the Signatory and Board of 
Governors levels determined by investment percentage.81 The Board of 
Governors, however, restricts any one Governor from exercising more 
than forty percent of the Board's total voting power.82 
The responsiveness of the Board of Governor's weighted voting pro-
cedures, to the goal of easy access to the direct broadcast satellite sys-
there is a maximum of only 75 orbital slots available to direct broadcast satellites. See 
Gold, supra note 2, at 82. 
78. See Intelsat, supra note 7. 
79. The three groups are the Assembly of Parties, the Meeting of Signatories, and the 
Board of Governors. See notes 37 & 38 supra. 
80. See Intelsat, supra note 7, art. VII, para. (f). 
f) Decisions on matters of substance (in the Assembly of Parties) shall be 
taken by an affirmative vote cast by at least two-thirds of the Parties whose 
representatives are present and voting. 
Article VIII, para. (b)(e) stated: 
Each signatory shall have one vote. Decisions on matters of substance shall be 
taken by an affirmative vote cast by at least two-thirds of the Signatories . 
present and voting. 
Article IX, para. (j)(i) states: 
!The Board of Governors! on all substantive questions ... at least two-thirds 
of the total voting participation of all Signatories represented on the Board of 
Governors .... 
81. See note 40 supra. 
82. See note 43 supra. 
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tern, has been criticized as being "incompatible with the principles of 
sovereign equality ."83 The most frequent proponents of this argument 
are the U.S.S.R. and the Latin American countries which are members 
oflntelsat. 84 Despite the validity of the principle behind the agreement, 
it would be rather unrealistic to suppose that governments would invest 
in such a system in varying proportions and then not expect to receive 
voting participation equivalent to their investment. It has been noted 
by other authors th~t the implementation of any plan which did not 
consider the financial investment of countries would result in the devel-
opment of competing systems and thus run counter to the concept of a 
single international system.85 The end result of abandoning a weighted 
voting procedure would be even more barriers to international coopera-
tion than exist at the present. Therefore, the present weighted voting 
system would appear to be the most practical solution in light of the 
substantial funding needed to operate an international satellite system 
composed of direct broadcast satellites. 
The second and more controversial area is that of the two-thirds 
requirement in the Assembly of Parties by which use of the Intelsat 
satellites is determined. Under the present system an applicant country 
would be denied the use of any of Intelsat's direct broadcast satellites 
unless a two-thirds majority of the present and voting Members favored 
such use. Most likely, the nations present and voting .would be those in 
the particular region into which the applicant country wished to broad-
cast. Therefore, if more than one-third of the countries in that region 
objected to the applicant's use of the direct broadcast satellite, that 
minority block of countries would prevent the rest of the region from 
receiving a program it may desire. This result would seem to run counter 
to the 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, this right 
includes freedom to hold opinion without interference and to seek, 
receive, and import information and ideas through any media regard-
less of frontiers. 86 
8:1. See Smith, supra note 1. 
84. Apart from the political factors which motivate Soviet criticism of the Western 
controlled Intelsat, it is unlikely that the Communist nations could gain control of the 
Board of Governors. This is because the Soviet usage of the Intelsat system would prob-
ably not be great enough to give it a voting percentage that would amount to veto power 
on the Board of Governors . It is highly unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would be content with 
only membership on the Board devoid of a veto. See Smith supra note 1, at 353. The 
arguments raised by the Latin American countries are also based primarily on a desire 
for greater control at the Signatory and Board levels. 
85. Id. at 352. 
86. G.A. Res . 217, art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 74-5 (1948). 
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Even so, the result is partially justified on the grounds that many coun-
tries in the region, which border on the country for whom the program 
was intended, would be subject to spill-over117 from the direct broadcast 
satellite. Until the state of the art is further developed, direct broadcast 
satellites will not possess pin-point accuracy, and spill-over will be a 
problem that must be dealt with due to the high abuse potential of 
direct broadcast satellites. 
The alternative solutions to the two-thirds majority requirement 
are either unanimous consent or one-vote veto power. Both of those 
solutions possess abuse and conflict potential much more serious than 
the present two-thirds vote requirement. 
There will, however, remain the additional argument that the two-
thirds requirement will foster charges of conspiracies among some coun-
tries of a region to prevent reception of programs by other countries 
within that region. Unfortunately, that problem will never be solved 
regardless of what voting system is adopted. Therefore, in light of the 
obvious abuses of a unanimity requirement or a one vote system, the 
present two-thirds requirement remains the lesser of the evils suggested. 
4. THE UNESCO DECLARATION AND THE U.S.S.R. DRAIT CONVENTION 
Both the UNESCO Declaration and the U.S.S.R. Draft Convention 
contain provisions that are relevant to the determination of the issue of 
access to the direct broadcast satellite. The UNESCO Declaration 
states that the benefits of satellite broadcasting should be available to 
all countries without discrimination and should be based upon interna-
tional cooperation, world-wide and regional. 1111 Similarly, the U.S.S.R. 
Draft Convention calls for all States to have an equal right to carry out 
direct television broadcasting without discrimination of any kind.119 
However, unlike the Intelsat agreements, there are no further provisions 
regarding how such access is to be achieved. The results, therefore, are 
that the Intelsat agreements, the UNESCO Declaration, and the 
U.S.S.R. Draft Convention all recognize the need for world-wide access 
to a direct broadcast satellite system. But, only Intelsat has made provi-
sions that at least respond to the problem of implementing world-wide 
access to the direct broadcast satellite. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Technically speaking, a single world-wide system would provide the 
87. The heam transmitted from a direct broadcast satellite has a basically cylindrical 
shape with a very gradual fall off from the central point of maximum strength. Thus in 
order to achieve truly national coverage the beam will of necessity spill into parts of 
neighhoring countries that stand within the circular field. See Gold, supra note 2, at 80. 
88. See UNESCO, .<;upra note 8, at 1477, art. III, para. (1) & (2). 
89. See U.S.S.R. , .<;Upra note 9, at 1378, art. I, para. (1) & (2). 
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most effective use and management of the limited frequency spectrum. 
It would avoid duplication of and interference with competing systems, 
improve operating efficiency, and reduce the technical and operating 
problems of compatibility between different space systems and other 
services. uo Economically speaking, there are strong inducements to the 
formation of a single telecommunications system. The most obvious 
of these is that the more nations that cooperate with one another, the 
less cost there will be per nation for the benefits of such a system. 
However, despite the technical and economic arguments, and despite 
the progress of the I. T. U. 91 and Intelsat92 in the area of international 
cooperation, very little real progress has been made toward the goal of 
establishing an international code of conduct as to the use of direct 
broadcast satellites. 
In addition to the difficulties of formulating a workable interna-
tional code as to the use of and access to the direct broadcast satellite, 
there are also the added efforts of the U.S.S.R., 93 Canada and Europe94 
to develop separate telecommunications systems. With the limited 
number of preferred orbital slots and allocated frequencies, 95 the 
potential for conflict among the competing systems is very high. 
The suggested solution to this state of affairs is to convene an inter-
national conference for the purposes of: (a) discussing the feasibility of 
a single internatiop.al telecommunication system, (b) developing an in-
ternational code of conduct as to the use of direct broadcast satellites, 
and (c) developing a uniform system of access to such a satellite system 
in order to ensure world-wide access. Present at such a conference would 
be three main groups: the Intelsat countries,96 Europe,97 and the coun-
tries involved in the U.S.S.R. satellite system.98 The Intelsat countries 
can be further divided into the lesser developed countries, such as Latin 
America and India, and the more developed countries, such as the 
United States, Canada, and France. Even though the United States has 
voted against the establishment of an international code of conduct in 
the past, 99 there is no reason to believe that it would not attend a confer-
90. S ee Smith, supra note 1, at 350. 
91. See notes 10-16, supra and accompanying text. 
92 . See notes :30-43 supra and accompanying text. 
93 . See note 44 supra. 
94. See note 45 supra . 
%. See note 79 supra and accompanying text. 
96. See note 7 supra. 
97 . In reference to Europe, there are some countries such as France, Italy, Federal 
Republic of Germany, and Spain that are members of Intelsat and at the same time 
involved in European efforts to establish regional telecommunication systems. Supra note 
42. 
98. See note 44 supra. 
99. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. 
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ence called for the purpose of discussing a single international telecom-
munication system. mo 
The concept of establishing a single international telecommuni-
cation system is an unrealistic one. Nations will, for reasons of security 
or national prestige or politics, be concerned about a single world-wide 
system over which they would have little control and which might be 
under the control of an unsympathetic country. Among such nations are 
France, Canada, the Soviet Union and oddly enough the United 
States. rn• The most persistent barrier to a single world-wide system is 
the refusal of the Soviet Union to cooperate with Intelsat. The political 
and propaganda factors involved are of such an intensity that Commun-
ist participation in any form of Western-dominated system is highly 
unlikely. rn2 
Perhaps the concept of a single global system could be realized, 
however, if one interpreted single to mean a number of interconnected 
regional systems woven into a single global system. 103 This solution 
100. The United States has always favored a single system, and in fact the U.S. had 
suggested the addition of a paragraph to Article I of the Intelsat Agreement that would 
have explicitly bound the signatories to a single system and would have pledged them not 
to participate in any other program. This paragraph was not included though, and the 
efforts of the Canadians, .Japanese, Germans and French to develop satellite capabilities 
indicate that the universal principle will be fragmented. See Smith, supra note 1, at 344. 
IOI. Concern for security, absolute control, and possibly costs contributed strongly 
to the establishment of a U.S. Department of Defense Communication Satellite System. 
Political chauvinism plus distrust of the political potential of Intelsat doubtless were 
major factors in the decision of the Soviets not to join Intelsat. France has indicated its 
intent to establish its own system for primarily political and prestige reasons. Canada's 
discussion of a separate system for domestic purposes was openly motivated by political 
desires to avoid losing control of its domestic communication system to the United States 
or Intelsat . See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11, at 112 n.49. 
102. It has been suggested though, that the Soviets may hope to bargain for a dispro-
portionate voice on Intelsat by their development of a successfully competitive satellite 
system of their own. See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11, at 125. 
In the related area of earth resource satellites, there has been a significant shift in 
the Soviet attitude toward international control of the collection and distribution of data 
from such satellites. Earth resource satellites are used for scanning the earth with highly 
sensitive cameras and sensors for location of valuable natural resources. The Soviet Union 
has proposed that the United Nations establish a center for the collection and distribution 
of data obtained from such satellites. Until now, the Soviets have been unwilling to have 
any international authority involved. N .Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1974, at 20, col. 3. 
This recent shift in attitude could be an indicator of a possible willingness to allow a 
non-Western dominated international agency, under the auspices of the U.N., to have 
authority over an international telecommunication satellite system. It has already been 
noted that the U.S.S.R. supports an international convention on the use of direct broad-
cast satellites as evidenced by its proposed Draft Convention. See notes 62 & 63 supra and 
accompanying text. 
Im. This theory has been criticized as being naive in that it disregards the political 
realities of the situation. See Smith, supra note 14, at 351. 
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would seem to be the most practical in light of the present development 
of a number of telecommunications satellites. Through such a system 
each region would be able to retain some control over its own area, while 
at the same time benefiting from the use of other regional systems. Such 
a system would be ideal for direct broadcast satellites, which are limited 
as to the number which may be orbited. 104 
Provided such a "single international telecommunications system" 
could be achieved, there would still remain the problem of the lack of 
an internationally accepted code of conduct as to use of any direct 
broadcast satellites within the system. Without such a code, each 
regional system would be operating under its own standards. The 
results would be international conflict and abuse of the direct broadcast 
satellites under the control of a region. 105 Such a result would defeat the 
purpose of a regionally interconnected system. 
The second issue to be dealt with at the Conference would be the 
development of an international code of conduct as to the use of direct 
broadcast satellites. Opposition to the development of such a code 
would be minimal. As previously noted, a U .N. General Assembly reso-
lution calling for a convention to deal with this issue, was almost unani-
mously adopted. 106 As early as 1963, during the discussions of the Decla-
ration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, the Latin American countries ex-
pressed their view that there should be some reference to international 
scrutiny of a global satellite system. 107 With the rapid development and 
imminent use of the direct broadcast satellite, there are presently more 
reasons to support such international scrutiny than in 1963. \It has 
already been noted that the U.S.S.R. favors the formationiof an 
international code of conduct. 108 The only possible opposition to the 
development of an international code of conduct would be that of the 
United States. As previously mentioned, the United States was the only 
country in the General Assembly that voted against the resolution call-
104. See note 71 supra and accompanying text. 
105. A good example would be if the United States, through Intelsat, was using a 
direct broadcast satellite to beam propaganda into a Soviet country without its approval. 
The Soviet country would probably be operating under the U.S .S.R. Draft Convention 
principles. Instead of using .diplomatic channels, the receiving country, under Article IX 
(supra note mn would proceed to shoot the satellite out of the sky. This is precisely the 
sort of situation sought to be avoided through the use of inter-connected regional systems. 
!Of}. See note 27 supra and accompanying text . 
107. Brazil, in particular, wanted a ban on the utilization of a communication system 
based on satellites for purposes of encouraging national racial or class rivalries. See W . 
• h-:NKS, SPACF. LAW 261 (1965) [hereinafter cited as W. JENKS[. 
108. See note 62 supra and accompanying text. Also note that as early as 1963, the 
U.S.S.R. was demanding a prohibition on the use of outer space for propagating war, 
nation al hatred or enmity between nations. See note 107 supra. 
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ing for the development of such a code. 109 The suggested reason for such 
opposition was the heavy United States financial committment to Intel-
sat and the fear that such a code would conflict with the Intelsat agree-
ments.110 However, the Intelsat agreements contain ample references to 
the adoption of rules to regulate the use of the Intelsat satellite sys-
tem.111 Therefore, in light of the world-wide recognition of the need for 
regulation of satellite communications and the high abuse potential of 
the direct broadcast satellite, it may be posited that it would be in the 
best interests of the United States to support the development of an 
international code. 
It is suggested that such an international code be modelled after the 
UNESCO and U.S.S.R. proposals, 112 except that Article IX of the Soviet 
Draft Convention be omitted. 113 In its place should be adopted an arbi-
tration system similar to that of Intelsat's, 114 but with the addition of a 
provision that would permit a country that was a non-Member of any 
regional system access to the arbitration process of the offending region. 
As for inter-region arbitration, the only effective method would be to 
have an independent arbitration tribunal made up of representatives 
from each Member region in the telecommunication system. Only in 
that way would impartial settlements be achieved in an inter-region 
dispute. The main obstacle to be overcome in adopting such an arbitra-
tion system would be that of an unwillingness on the part of nations to 
vest an independent body with authority that would impinge on na-
tional sovereignty. If a truly workable global telecommunication system 
is to be achieved, such obstacles must be overcome. 
The third issue to be dealt with at such a conference would be that 
of developing a uniform system of access to a direct broadcast satellite 
system. Without such access based upon nondiscriminatory methods, 
the technologically advanced and financially capable countries will ob-
tain a monopoly over the use of direct broadcast satellites. 115 The result 
would be that the lesser developed countries would be denied a voice in 
determining the actual use of the direct broadcast satellite system. 
There is agreement among most nations of the world, as evidenced by 
the Intelsat agreements, UNESCO Draft Declaration, and the U.S.S.R. 
109 . See note 27 supra and accompanying text. Also note that during the 1963 discus-
sions on the Declaration of Legal Principles, the United States voted against the inclusion 
of any express declaration prohibiting the use of outer space for propaganda. See W . 
• JF.NKR, supra note 107. 
110. See note 7 supra. 
111. See notes :16, 37, 50 & 53 supra and accompanying text. 
112. See notes 8 & 9 supra respectively. 
l l :l. See note 6:-3 supra and accompanying text. 
114. See note S4 supra and accompanying text. 
115. See note 76 supra. 
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Draft Convention that the benefits of direct broadcast satellites should 
be available to all countries. 116 The only source of disagreement is the 
) 
manner in which such world-wide access is to be achieved. 
Intelsat's weighted voting procedures at the Board of Governors 
level, minimum investment requirements for participation at the Signa-
tory level, and two-thirds requirement for approval of access to its facili-
ties117 have been sharply criticized. However, most of this criticism has 
been centered in the countries without a large financial stake in Intelsat, 
and from the U.S.S.R. 118 The lesser developed nations with low invest-
ment in Intelsat will strive for a one-vote/one-nation procedure to be 
used in determining access to any telecommunication system. Such a 
system would be unrealistic in the light of the considerable funds needed 
to operate a telecommunication system. 119 It is suggested therefore that 
some form of weighted voting, according to investment, will be inevita-
ble in any regional system that is developed. 
As to the two-thirds requirement that Intelsat uses to determine 
access to and use of their satellite system, until direct broadcasting is 
capable of greater accuracy and the problems of spill-over have disap-
peared, some form of majority consent within a region will be needed. 
As noted earlier a two-thirds requirement carries less abuse potential 
than the alternatives of either unanimous consent or one vote veto 
power. 120 Therefore it is suggested that a two-thirds requirement similar 
to that of Intelsat's be adopted as an international standard. This will 
not be an easy task to accomplish because each nation will have its own 
idea as to what voting system will be the most equitable, and each 
nation will strive for whatever voting system will give it the most lever-
age. 
There is, therefore, no assurance that the nations of the world will 
agree oh every issue presented at the suggested conference. However, 
unless immediate steps are taken to achieve international agreement 
and cooperation, as to the use of and access to direct broadcast satel-
lites, the world will run the risk of allowing the great benefits to be 
derived from such satellites to be lost in the flurry of conflicts that will 
be generated in the absence of effective international regulatory stan-
dards. 
Gary C. Merckel 
116. See notes 7, 88 & 89 supra and accompanying text. 
117. See note 80 supra. 
118. See notes 83 & 84 supra and accompanying text. 
119. See note 85 supra and accompanying text. 
120. Supra page 113. 
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